What to Know
- Ether.fi plans to cut its final structural link between its staking tokens and EigenLayer this quarter.
- Protocol documentation showed under 1% of assets still restaked as of August, with EigenPod withdrawal credentials expected to be removed by the end of the year.
- Restaking held $10.02 billion on Sept. 8 but generated only $99,977 in fees over the prior week.
- Liquid staking held $51.87 billion and generated $27.35 million over the same period, earning roughly 53 times more per dollar secured.
- The five largest remaining liquid restaking tokens generated $953,350 in combined gross profit in the second quarter of 2026, down from $2.18 million three quarters earlier.
- Ether.fi removed restaking from weETH in August, making it a plain liquid staking token across DeFi collateral markets.
- Users seeking restaking exposure now need to opt into a separate token built on Symbiotic.
- Ether.fi is repositioning around crypto neobanking, including a card, borrowing markets, vaults, tokenized stocks, metals and fiat rails.
Ether.fi Steps Back From Its Original Restaking Model
Ether.fi is moving further away from the business that helped define the early liquid restaking boom. By the end of this quarter, the protocol is expected to sever the last structural connection between its staking tokens and EigenLayer, the restaking platform that once sat at the center of Ethereum’s most aggressive yield narrative.
The move marks a significant turn for a protocol that launched in 2024 with automatic restaking at the core of its product design. At that time, deposits were routed into EigenLayer by default, giving users exposure to Ethereum staking yield while also participating in a second layer of potential rewards tied to securing external services. That promise helped liquid restaking tokens become one of the fastest-growing categories in decentralized finance during the first weeks of 2024.
By August, however, ether.fi had stripped restaking from weETH, the version of its token that circulates broadly across DeFi and is accepted as collateral. The token now functions as a plain liquid staking token. Users who still want restaking exposure must opt into a separate product built on Symbiotic, a rival platform. Protocol documentation showed under 1% of assets still restaked as of August, with EigenPod withdrawal credentials due to be removed by the end of the year.
Ether.fi CEO Mike Silagadze has framed the decision around the balance between risk and reward. He said there were no meaningful yield opportunities in restaking and that perceived risk among stakers made an exit sensible. That risk calculation has become more important as restaking moved from a subsidized growth market into a lower-margin, more operationally complex segment of DeFi.
Why Restaking Lost Its Yield Advantage
Restaking was built on a simple but powerful idea. ETH already locked to secure Ethereum could be used again to secure other services, such as oracles and data availability layers. Those services would pay for security, and depositors would receive an additional return on top of base staking yield. Liquid restaking tokens added another layer by giving users a tradable receipt that could be sold, deployed in DeFi, or used as collateral instead of leaving ETH fully idle.
In practice, the economics did not develop as quickly as the market narrative. EigenLayer held $19.7 billion at its peak, while liquid restaking tokens grew more than 1,000% in the first six weeks of 2024. Yet the services buying security did not pay enough to cover both the base staking yield and a meaningful premium. The expected second yield, which was the main reason to accept additional complexity, never fully arrived for many users.
On Sept. 8, DefiLlama’s restaking category held $10.02 billion and generated $99,977 in fees over the previous week. The liquid staking category, by contrast, held $51.87 billion and generated $27.35 million. On a per-dollar-secured basis, ordinary liquid staking earned roughly 53 times more than restaking. For protocols and depositors, that gap made it harder to justify added technical, smart-contract and operational risk.
The incentive structure weakened further as points programs that had helped attract deposits wound down through 2025. Slashing also went live in April 2025. Slashing is the mechanism that can confiscate part of an operator’s staked ETH if the operator misbehaves, including by going offline or signing conflicting messages. Before that, much of the downside had been theoretical. Once slashing became live, restaking carried a clearer priced risk without a matching increase in yield.
Remaining Liquid Restaking Protocols Face Lower Profits
Outside ether.fi, the remaining liquid restaking sector has become smaller and less profitable. Renzo, Kelp, Swell, Puffer Finance and Bedrock, the five largest remaining liquid restaking tokens, generated $953,350 in combined gross profit in the second quarter of 2026. Three quarters earlier, the same five generated $2.18 million.
The individual numbers show how thin the business has become for some participants. Puffer, which raised $23 million, recorded $21,590 for the quarter. Swell recorded $22,370. Those figures suggest that the protocol-level business of liquid restaking has struggled to translate large total value secured into durable earnings.
Income statements also point to a deeper issue: much of the profit did not come from restaking itself. On Kelp’s books, EIGEN token rewards appeared as $460,600 in gross revenue and $460,600 in cost of revenue, meaning the rewards passed through to depositors and left nothing with the protocol. Puffer and Swell treated staking rewards similarly. For many operators, the profitable component was ordinary staking fees underneath the restaking layer, not the additional restaking wrapper.
The Kelp Exploit Changed How Markets Viewed Wrappers
Restaking’s risk debate intensified after the April 18 exploit involving Kelp’s cross-chain bridge. An attacker created 116,500 rsETH in 46 minutes, worth about $293 million, without ETH backing. The attacker then deposited the tokens into Aave as collateral and borrowed real ether against them. Around $6 billion left Aave in the days that followed, with potential bad debt estimated at $123 million to $230 million.
In May, Aave revised its collateral listing standards to assess cybersecurity and technical architecture alongside price volatility. That change reflected a broader shift in how lending markets evaluate wrapped assets. A token may track ETH economically, but if the wrapper relies on bridges or other smart-contract systems, those systems become part of the collateral risk.
Silagadze has argued that the Kelp incident should not be seen as a failure of leverage or EigenLayer itself. He has said the cause was poor cross-chain security practices rather than leverage, and emphasized that ether.fi’s Aave market uses conservative parameters and that the protocol maintains a strong commitment to security. EigenLayer itself did not fail in the incident. There was no slashing event, no restaking mechanism breakdown and no direct failure of the core restaking layer.
Even so, the exploit was damaging for liquid restaking tokens because the weak point was the wrapper, not the base restaking system. For users, the practical conclusion was uncomfortable: holding a liquid restaking token could mean accepting another software layer that might be attacked, while receiving little or no extra yield for taking that additional risk.
Capital Rotates From Restaking Into Dollar-Based Strategies
The retreat from restaking has not meant a broad exit from crypto lending. Instead, capital has increasingly moved from ETH-centered recursive strategies into dollar-based structures. In 2024, the dominant pattern involved staking ETH, restaking it, wrapping it in a liquid restaking token, borrowing against that collateral and increasing exposure to the same underlying asset.
By 2026, similar risk behavior has been visible in curated vaults. A curated vault is a lending pool where an outside curator, rather than the lending protocol itself, decides which assets the pool accepts and under what terms. The curator receives a share of fees for managing the risk parameters. Morpho, the largest venue for this structure, holds around $5.8 billion.
The resemblance to liquid restaking lies in the chain of delegated risk. A depositor receives a receipt token, the risk profile is shaped by a third party, and another platform may accept the position as collateral. That structure can support capital efficiency, but it can also create fragile loops when valuations or assumptions break.
Curated vaults have already seen a major stress event. On Nov. 4, 2025, Stream Finance disclosed roughly $93 million of losses and froze withdrawals. Its xUSD token, a yield-bearing dollar token designed to hold its value at $1, fell 77% in a day. Curators had built Morpho vaults where depositors supplied real stablecoins against xUSD, and borrowed stablecoins were used to buy more xUSD. Those markets valued xUSD at a fixed $1 rather than its market price, so liquidations did not trigger as expected when the real price fell. Researchers later mapped roughly $285 million of debt exposure across lending platforms. A second dollar token, 65% backed by loans to Stream, fell about 98% and was wound down.
Ether.fi Rebuilds Around Crypto Neobanking
Ether.fi’s response has been to reposition itself beyond staking. The protocol now operates a card that lets users spend against crypto without selling it, a borrowing market on Ethereum layer-2 network Optimism, and a set of vaults. It describes the broader direction as crypto neobanking. In August, it added tokenized stocks, metals and fiat rails, widening its product set beyond Ethereum yield products.
Silagadze has put the neobanking market at roughly $300 billion in annual revenue, about 300 times DeFi’s size. Within ether.fi, the card’s share of monthly revenue rose from 17% in January to 46% in July. He has said neobank revenue has fully replaced revenue lost from restaking and lower ETH price, and that the protocol is on track to increase overall revenue run rate this year by about 38%, while staking and restaking revenue has declined by 70%.
DefiLlama figures show a more cautious picture on profit. Ether.fi’s gross profit fell 47% from $18.71 million in the third quarter of 2025 to $9.99 million in the second quarter of 2026. Both statements can coexist because gross revenue differs from gross profit, and a forward run rate differs from a trailing quarter. Ether.fi has not published the basis for the 38% figure.
Card fees produced $3.14 million of gross profit in the second quarter. EigenLayer restaking produced $2.87 million, ahead of core ETH staking and ahead of vault fees, borrowing and management fees combined. On DefiLlama’s accounting, restaking was still ether.fi’s second most profitable line at the point it decided to leave. Silagadze has disputed one input involving cashback rewards, saying third-party partners had previously paid those rewards and that current revenue reporting no longer includes cashback subsidy grants.
Restaking Technology Continues, But the Business Case Has Shifted
The weakening of liquid restaking economics does not mean the technology has failed. EigenDA, EigenLayer’s data availability service, runs on mainnet at 100 MB/s and remains the largest service by value secured. Symbiotic, where ether.fi moved its own restaking option, has integrated more than 50 networks.
The key question is whether restaking can generate enough revenue to support businesses built primarily around it. For protocols that treated restaking itself as the product, the recent numbers suggest the answer has become increasingly difficult. EigenLayer has also shifted how it presents the market. Rebranded as EigenCloud, it now focuses on verifiable computing, allowing applications to prove that off-chain work was carried out correctly, with restaked collateral functioning as infrastructure underneath rather than as the product being sold.
EigenLayer’s holdings stand at $5.10 billion, down from $22.06 billion in August 2025. The unresolved debate is whether the market’s roughly 75% contraction signals failure or simply shows that the sector had grown far beyond the amount of security demand actually needed. Ether.fi is not waiting for that question to be settled. It is reducing exposure to the restaking thesis and trying to build a broader financial platform around spending, borrowing and asset access.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is ether.fi changing about its restaking exposure?
Ether.fi is removing the final structural link between its staking tokens and EigenLayer this quarter. Protocol documentation showed under 1% of assets still restaked as of August, with EigenPod withdrawal credentials due to be removed by the end of the year.
Why did ether.fi move away from restaking?
The protocol’s leadership has pointed to a lack of meaningful yield opportunities and rising perceived risk among stakers. With slashing live and restaking fees limited, the risk-reward balance became less attractive.
What happened to weETH?
In August, ether.fi removed restaking from weETH, turning it into a plain liquid staking token for use across DeFi collateral markets. Users who still want restaking exposure must opt into a separate token built on Symbiotic.
How profitable is restaking compared with liquid staking?
On Sept. 8, restaking held $10.02 billion and generated $99,977 in fees over the prior week. Liquid staking held $51.87 billion and generated $27.35 million, meaning ordinary staking earned roughly 53 times more per dollar secured.
Did EigenLayer fail during the Kelp exploit?
No. The Kelp incident involved a cross-chain bridge and a liquid restaking token wrapper. Nothing was slashed, no core restaking mechanism broke, and EigenLayer itself did not fail in that event.
What was the impact of the Kelp exploit?
An attacker created 116,500 rsETH in 46 minutes, worth about $293 million, without ETH backing. Around $6 billion left Aave in the following days, and potential bad debt was estimated at $123 million to $230 million.
What business is ether.fi pursuing now?
Ether.fi is building around crypto neobanking. Its products include a card for spending against crypto, a borrowing market on Optimism, vaults, tokenized stocks, metals and fiat rails.
Is restaking still useful technology?
Restaking technology continues to operate, and services such as EigenDA remain active. The challenge is not whether restaking can work technically, but whether it can generate enough revenue to justify protocol business models built mainly around it.
What does the restaking downturn mean for DeFi users?
It shows that additional yield layers can introduce extra smart-contract, bridge and collateral risks. DeFi users may increasingly compare those risks against actual protocol revenue and realized returns rather than relying on growth narratives alone.
